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When reading the careful, ingenious and illuminating essays contained
in this collection, you cannot help but be struck by John Fischer’s
intellectual honesty. More than twenty years ago, he described the
broad outlines of his now very famous positions. But his accounts of
moral responsibility, of the nature of control, of the value of morally
responsible action and of the relations of these things to determinism,
have been reﬁned through serious and careful engagement with the
many discussions and arguments that have been offered in response to
his views. He doesn’t let published criticisms or proposed reﬁnements
fall through the cracks. Instead, he picks them up. He takes the argu-
ments of others tremendously seriously, gives them their due, charitably
characterizes what insights are contained in them, and determines with
precision, and expresses with great clarity, their impact on his own
positions. Fischer is at his best, perhaps, when he untangles argumenta-
tive complexity and describes what positions remain available once
what is right about his own or other people’s arguments is separated
from what is not. I am going to focus here on one line of argument,
although, as we’ll see, it intersects with others. What this means is that
I am neglecting a lot of great value that is contained between the cov-
ers of My Way. But I hope to be giving Fischer the same compliment
that he pays to others by engaging with the details of one of his argu-
mentative lines.
What does adherence to the maxim that ought-implies-can commit
us to with regard to the question of the sense, if any, in which alternate
possibilities are required for moral responsibility? There are several
ways of approaching this question. In his essay ‘‘‘Ought-Implies-Can,’
Causal Determinism, and Moral Responsibility’’, Fischer starts by con-
sidering Ishtiyaque Haji’s claim that if determinism is true, then there
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is nothing that anyone ought or ought not to do.1 Deontic judgments,
according to Haji, are all false under determinism. Haji’s argument uses
ought-implies-can as a premise. The argument looks like this:
(1.1) (S A’s & S ought not to A) ﬁ (S ought to do something
other than A)
(1.2) (S ought to do something other than A) ﬁ (S can do some-
thing other than A)
(1.3) (Determinism & S A’s) ﬁ not-(S can do something other
than A)
(1.4) Determinism ﬁ not-(S ought not to A)
I’ve argued elsewhere that (1.1) is false.2 Someone who meets an obliga-
tion not to act not through action but through inaction would not nec-
essarily be failing to meet some other obligation to act. Thus, it must
be possible to meet an obligation not to act without being under any
obligation to act. The person who meets his obligation not to sell drugs
while asleep is not thereby shirking some obligation to act at that time.
Several people have criticized this objection to (1.1), including Haji.3
But Fischer grants it and so agrees that (1.1) is false. But he thinks the
argument can be reformulated using a true premise similar to (1.1). To
appreciate Fischer’s reformulation, let’s ﬁx a pair of terms (these terms
are mine, not Fischer’s):
S’s bodily movement M is a refraining from A-ing iﬀ (1) M is
not an A-ing, & (2) M is intentional under the description
‘‘not A-ing’’.
1 Ishtiyaque Haji, Deontic Morality and Control, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002, esp. pp. 36-58.
2 Gideon Yaﬀe, ‘‘’Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities’’ in
Analysis, v. 59, n. 3, July 1999. And ‘‘More on ‘Ought Implies Can’ and Alternate
Possibilities’’ in Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Free Will and Responsibility, v. 29,
2005.
3 Alex Blum, ‘‘The Kantian versus Frankfurt’’ in Analysis, 60 (2000) : 287-88; Ira
Schnall ‘‘The Principle of Alternate Possibilities and ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’’’ in Anal-
ysis, 61 (2001) 335-340; Ishtiyaque Haji, Deontic Morality and Control, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002, esp. pp. 54-58; David Copp, ‘‘’Ought’ Implies
‘Can’, Blameworthiness, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities’’ in Moral
Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, D. Widerker and M. McKenna, eds., Al-
dershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003, pp. 265-299; David Copp, ‘‘‘Ought’ Implies
‘Can’ and the Derivation of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities’’, forthcoming in
Analysis.
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S’s bodily movement M is an omitting of A iﬀ (1) M is not an
A-ing, & (2) M is not intentional under the description ‘‘not
A-ing’’.
The deﬁnitions here are depending on a Davidsonian theory of action.
But the distinction could be drawn without that background theory. I
am stipulating that ‘‘refraining’’ refers to cases in which we do some-
thing in furtherance of an intention not to do something else, and
‘‘omitting’’ refers to cases in which we do in fact fail to act in a partic-
ular way, but nothing which we do is done in furtherance of any inten-
tion not to act that way. To alter Davidson’s famous example, consider
the person who turns on the light and does not alert the burglar
upstairs.4 If he intended not to alert him because, for instance, he is
hoping to sneak up on him—if the movement of his ﬁnger on the
switch is intentional under the description ‘‘not alerting the bur-
glar’’—then he is refraining from alerting the burglar. However, if he
has no idea there is a burglar in the house, then he is omitting to alert
the burglar; his bodily movement is an instance of not alerting the bur-
glar, but it is not intentional under that description. My objection to
(1.1) was driven by the observation that an obligation not to A could
be met by omitting A; (1.1) seems plausible only when we think of obli-
gations not to act as fulﬁlled only through refrainings.
Using the refraining ⁄omitting distinction, we can express Fischer’s
reformulation of the argument like this:
(2.1) (S A’s & S ought not to A) ﬁ (S ought to have refrained or
omitted from A-ing)
(2.2) (S ought to have refrained or omitted from A-ing) ﬁ (S
could have refrained or omitted from A-ing)
(2.3) (Determinism & S A’s) ﬁ (not-(S could have refrained or
omitted from A-ing)).
(2.4) [ (Determinism & S A’s) ﬁ not-(S A’s & S ought not to
A)
(2.1) is true, thinks Fischer, because it involves the recognition that
obligations not to act can be fulﬁlled either through true action, what
4 In Davidson’s example, the person does alert the burglar, although does not know
that he has. Donald Davidson, ‘‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’’ in Essays on Actions
and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 3-19.
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I am calling ‘‘refraining’’, or through inaction, what I am calling
‘‘omitting’’. I wonder if it is ever true that an agent ought to X where
X is not an action; if it is not, then (2.1) is false. If this is right, then it
is possible to meet an obligation without it being the case that the
behavior through which one meets it is behavior that one ought to
have engaged in. I think this might be right, but let’s put that aside
and grant, for the sake of argument that (2.1) is true. Still, Fischer
rejects the conclusion in (2.4). He thinks that determinism is compatible
with deontic judgments to the effect that a person did something that
he ought not to have done. Fischer’s move is to reject premise (2.2)
and thereby to reject ought-implies-can.
Ought-implies-can has tremendous intuitive appeal, as Fischer recog-
nizes. Saving the appearances requires saving both the truth of deontic
judgments and ought-implies-can. Haji takes determinism to require us
to give up the one, Fischer the other, and so both think that determinism
is incompatible with some part of ordinary moral thought. But I think
both can be saved even in the face of determinism. And I’ve granted, for
the sake of argument, that (2.1) in Fischer’s revised version of Haji’s
argument is true. This position is coherent because I reject premise (2.3),
the claim that determinism undermines the ability to refrain or omit.
There’s been no shortage of literature on the claim that determinism
undermines the ability to act, as one does when one refrains. In fact, I
think it is fair to say that Fischer is, along with Peter Van Inwagen, the
most important contributor to that literature. Let’s grant, then, for the
sake of argument, that if determinism is true then no agent can refrain
from action and turn our attention to the question of whether determin-
ism undermines the ability of an agent to omit action. I think it does not
even granting that it undermines the ability to refrain. In fact, as I’ll sug-
gest, the thought that determinism undermines the ability to omit derives
from a failure to really appreciate the diﬀerence between refraining and
omitting. In short, we reach the conclusion of Fischer’s revised argu-
ment, (2.4), only by making the very same mistake that I have been
warning against from the beginning: the mistake of failing to appreciate
the diﬀerence between not doing something by doing the act of not act-
ing and not doing it by doing nothing at all.
To see this ﬁrst consider the following argument for the claim that
determinism undermines the ability to omit, an argument that I take to
be implicit in Fischer’s discussion. Here L and P are propositions
describing, respectively, the actual laws and the actual past prior to the
time of action:
(3.1) (Determinism & S A’s) ﬁ not-(Possibly((S omits A-ing) &
P &L)))
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(3.2) not-(Possibly((S omits A-ing) & P &L)) ﬁ not-(S could
omit A-ing)
(3.3) [ (Determinism & S A’s) ﬁ not-(S could omit A-ing)
The argument, in other words, runs like this: If determinism is true
and the agent acts, then there is no possible world in which the laws
and the past are held ﬁxed and in which the agent omits action. But
such a possibility is required for the agent to have the ability to omit.
Hence determinism undermines the ability to omit action on the part
of an agent who actually acted. Or, instead, let’s put the argument
using the metaphor of ‘‘accessibility of possible worlds’’, which is the
idiom that Fischer favors in certain contexts. Using that metaphor
the argument runs like this: If determinism is true and the agent acts,
then every possible world in which the agent omits is one in which
the laws or the past are different from those in the actual world.
However, the only possible worlds that are accessible from the actual
one are those in which the laws and the past are held ﬁxed; hence
the agent cannot get to the possible worlds in which he omits. But
for it to be the case that the agent could omit, it must be the case
not just that there is a possible world in which he omits, but also
that that world be accessible to the agent. Thus, if determinism is
true and the agent acts, then it is also the case that the agent could
not omit that action.
Now, I strongly dislike the metaphor of accessibility. It encourages a
thought which is not only misplaced, but pernicious when thinking
about abilities to behave otherwise than one has actually behaved. The
pernicious thought is that to act otherwise, as one does in some possi-
ble world, one must do something ﬁrst, namely ‘‘access’’ that possible
world, as though the world in which I pull the trigger that I didn’t
actually pull was behind some door that I needed to ﬁrst open before I
could pull the trigger. Still, if used carefully, the metaphor of accessibil-
ity does no damage. Talk of accessible worlds can be rephrased as talk
of relevantly similar possible worlds. Notice that premise (3.2) enshrines
the thought that every accessible possible world is one which is similar
to the actual world in its past and its laws. Why this constraint on
accessibility? The reason oﬀered by the Consequence Argument is that
the past and the laws are not things that agents can aﬀect. So, the
thought is, when deciding whether or not a possible world is accessible,
we must check to see if all those things that the agent is powerless to
aﬀect are as in the actual world; if not, then the world in question is
not accessible. Since the past and the laws ﬁt the bill, we are to conﬁne
our gaze to those: we are to check, that is, to see if in any world
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sharing the past and the laws with the actual world the agent acts
otherwise and we ﬁnd that, if determinism is true, she doesn’t.
But why should we conﬁne our gaze to worlds in which all those
things that the agent is powerless to affect are as in the actual world?
There is probably more than one way to capture this intuition, but
here’s one: When an agent is deliberating correctly about what to do,
he considers only those courses of conduct that he believes he has the
ability to do. In deciding what he has the ability to do, he is really ask-
ing himself what he might do given that the world is in some ways
unchangeable by him. That is, the deliberating agent holds ﬁxed those
things that he is, or believes himself to be, powerless to aﬀect. It would
be a waste of deliberative eﬀort to consider courses of conduct other
than those that are copossible with those actual conditions that one
cannot change. So far so good. But how do we get from this observa-
tion about deliberation to the view that worlds are inaccessible, in the
relevant sense, if they diﬀer from the actual world in ways the agent is
powerless to change? Why should the limits on the propriety of deliber-
ation place limits on what agents can and cannot do? It seems to me
that the gap must be ﬁlled by some claim to the eﬀect that agents can
meet their obligations only through behaviors that could have been
considered in the course of proper, non-defective deliberation. For
someone who makes such a claim, it just seems obvious that if X isn’t
something that the agent can properly consider deliberating about
whether or not to do, then X isn’t something that the agent can do in
the relevant sense of ‘‘can’’.
But notice that this is precisely the claim that is being denied by
someone who accepts, as both I and Fischer do, that it is possible to
meet an obligation not to act through omission. Omissions are not
properly considered in deliberation. A person who deliberates about
whether to be knocked unconscious through no exercise of his agency
before the moment of action is not deliberating properly; its not up to
him whether or not he omits and so he shouldn’t waste time deliberat-
ing about it. As I see it, we learn from the fact that it is possible to
meet an obligation through omission that the facts about what we can
properly consider in deliberation are not congruent with the facts about
what we can do in the sense of relevance to responsibility. The past
and the laws are to be held ﬁxed by the deliberator, and that might
even imply that they are to be held ﬁxed when asking the question of
whether the agent refrains in a relevant possible world; but they are
not to be held ﬁxed by the person considering whether the future might
involve his omitting to do something, and so they are not to be held
ﬁxed when asking the question of whether the agent omits in a relevant
possible world. Someone who agrees that we can meet our obligations
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not to act through omission ought to have low standards for accessibil-
ity when it comes to the question of what we can omit, and he very
well might have higher standards for accessibility when it comes to the
question of what we can refrain from doing.
So, premise (3.2) is false. In thinking about that premise, we equate
‘‘can omit A’’ with ‘‘there is a possible world in which S omits A and
that world is accessible’’. But the antecedent of the conditional in (3.2)
involves the tacit assumption that a world is accessible only if the past
and the laws are as in the actual world. As I’ve argued, this assumption
is false. A world could be accessible even if it differs from the actual
world in respects that the agent is powerless to affect. I’m granting for
the sake of argument that this is not generally true—I’m granting that
when compliance with the norm in question requires actual action, then
a world is accessible only if it shares the past and laws with the actual
world—but it is true when one can comply through omission. If I A in
a deterministic world violating a norm that tells me not to, it is still the
case that I can omit provided that there’s a possible world in which I
do not A, and even if that possible world diﬀers from the actual in its
past or its laws. This claim is compatible with saying that one cannot
refrain from A if all those worlds in which one does refrain diﬀer from
the actual in the past or the laws.
Fischer expresses disagreement with this line of thought in his book.
In the following passage, he uses the phrase ‘‘intentional not-Xing’’ to
refer to what I have called ‘‘refraining’’ and ‘‘unintentional not-Xing’’
to what I am calling ‘‘omitting’’. He writes:
I do not see why the move from requiring that the not-Xing be inten-
tional to allowing it to be unintentional entails any change in the con-
ditions of accessibility. After all, the motivation behind ‘‘ought implies
can’’ seems to entail that if one ought not to X, then one not-X’s in
some possible world one can ‘‘get to from here.’’ If one is willing to
accept this in the context of actions and intentional not-Xings, one
should, it seems, accept it in the context of unintentional not-Xings.
(p. 220)
But there is a reason: if the behavior the norm is demanding that one
engage in is not action—if an omission will do—then it needn’t be the
case that ‘‘getting to elsewhere from here’’ be accomplished by doing
anything; a world in which I don’t act is accessible even if it is not one
that I could properly deliberate about realizing. Further, and more
importantly for our purposes here, this is a reason that Fischer himself
is committed to accepting by his views on another topic, namely his
well-known response to the ‘‘ﬂickers of freedom’’ approach to the
Frankfurt counterexamples to PAP. Let me conclude by explaining.
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Quite some time ago, Fischer recognized that some would argue that
there are alternate possibilities available to the subjects of Frankfurt
examples. If, for instance, the counterfactual intervener would intervene
were the agent to blush, and the agent doesn’t in fact, then, at the
least, the agent could have blushed, and so could have come to act as he
actually did through the exercise of the intervener’s nefarious powers
instead of acting on his own. In responding, Fischer argues that the
alternatives in such cases are not suﬃciently ‘‘robust’’. As I understand
it, this is a symmetry argument. Fischer’s idea is that whatever the
opponent takes to be required for responsibility in the actual sequence
over and above alternate possibilities must be true in the alternate
sequence too. Otherwise, the possible alternative isn’t suﬃciently
‘‘robust’’. But the symmetry principle that Fischer’s argument here
employs commits him to the view that I am pressing with regard to
‘‘accessibility’’. Say that an agent ought not to A at noon and he com-
plies with this norm by omitting A at noon; there’s a power outage so
his alarm fails to go oﬀ at 11:55, and so he’s asleep at noon. It’s a
further fact about this agent that if the alarm had gone oﬀ—if the
world had been diﬀerent in ways that the agent was powerless to
realize—then he would have awakened in time to violate the norm by
A-ing at noon. Could he have A’d at noon? The principles of symmetry
that Fischer employs in objecting to the ﬂicker of freedom theorists,
together with his acceptance of the view that this agent meets his obli-
gation not to A at noon when he omits A-ing at noon, commit him to
answering ‘‘yes’’. After all, a variety of conditions conspired to bring it
about that the agent actually omitted A-ing at noon and none of those
conditions were realized through exercises of his agency. By symmetry,
then, the alternative in which the alarm does go oﬀ, also through no
exercise of his agency, is suﬃciently ‘‘robust’’. But that amounts to say-
ing that it is a world that the agent ‘‘can get to from here’’ even though
it diﬀers from the actual world in its past or its laws. Fischer likes sym-
metry. So do I. So he should join me in accepting its implications.
Philosophers who think about freedom owe a great debt to John
Fischer. This debt is owed not just because he has made great progress
on issues about which all of us deeply care, but also because he never
fails to bring us all into the debate, no matter how small our contribu-
tions. I am personally grateful to him for this. I’ve tried to express
that gratitude here by extending one conversation just one small step
further.
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